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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL
CENTER V. NASSAR: THE SUPREME COURT’S “HEADS THE
EMPLOYER WINS, TAILS THE EMPLOYEE LOSES” DECISION

INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt two blows to employees and
the protections Congress guaranteed them under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by taking employer-friendly stances on fundamental questions
regarding the interpretation and application of Title VII.1 In fact, the Supreme
Court’s recent employment law jurisprudence has led Justice Ginsburg to label
it as a “heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses” analysis.2 In one of
the recent decisions, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar, the focus of this Note, the Supreme Court enforced a “but-for”
causation standard for retaliation claims under Title VII, even after recognizing
that Title VII status-based discrimination claims—claims involving direct
discrimination based upon a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin—enjoy a lesser motivating-factor causation standard.3
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision rested in part upon the text and
structure of a 1991 amendment to Title VII—an amendment that Congress
itself labeled as an attempt to broaden protection under Title VII.4 Instead, the
Court construed the amendment in a way that actually restricts the protection
intended for victims of retaliation.5 Moreover, the Supreme Court disregarded
established precedent that has both defined retaliation as just another form of
status-based discrimination and determined that it should be treated as such.6
Thus, the Supreme Court effectively created a distinction between different

1. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Vance v. Ball
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2454 (2013).
2. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 2528 (majority opinion). Status-based discrimination is direct discrimination in
hiring, firing, promotion, and other employment decisions on the basis of an individual’s
protected status, i.e., discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). Retaliation is discrimination on account of an employee
having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for, unlawful workplace discrimination. See
id. § 2000e-3(a). These provisions will be discussed later in this Note. See infra Part I.
4. H.R. REP. NO. 102–40, pt. II, at 2–4 (1991). See infra Part III.
5. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. See infra Part I.
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types of discrimination and made it harder for employees to get relief for
retaliatory efforts of their employers.
The effects of this decision are immediate and catastrophic, especially for
trial courts left with the mess of trying to properly instruct juries in Title VII
cases in which the plaintiff alleges both status-based discrimination and
retaliation (a common occurrence).7 Indeed, “[a]sking jurors to determine
liability based on different standards in a single case is virtually certain to sow
confusion.”8 Moreover, because the decision weakens Title VII’s prohibition
against retaliation, employees will be less willing to confront discrimination in
the workplace for fear of the retaliatory efforts of their employers.9 Title VII’s
prohibition against status-based discrimination depends in large part on
employees policing their employers, and, thus, without their participation, Title
VII’s overall scheme will suffer.10 In light of these important adverse effects,
Congress must act. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in Nassar,
the Supreme Court’s “misguided judgment” in Nassar “should prompt yet
another Civil Rights Restoration Act.”11
Part I of this Note will discuss the applicable sections of Title VII, as well
as Supreme Court decisions interpreting and broadening antiretaliation
provisions. Part II will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court’s first major decision regarding causation
standards in mixed-motive cases under Title VII. Part III will then discuss the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its amendments to Title VII, as well as lower
courts’ decisions regarding the applicability of Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Act to Title VII retaliation claims. Part IV will then analyze Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., a key turning point in the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding causation standards. Part V will provide a detailed analysis of
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Supreme
Court’s most recent decision regarding a motivating-factor standard in Title
VII retaliation claims. Part VI will provide a critique of the Court’s decision in
Nassar. Finally, Part VII will propose that Congress amend Title VII in light of
the Court’s decision.

7. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part VI.C.
10. See infra Part VI.C.
11. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion of a
“Civil Rights Restoration Act” refers to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a set of amendments to Title
VII, and other statutes Congress enacted in response to Supreme Court decisions which reduced
the protections afforded to individuals under those statutes. See also infra Part III.
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I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”12 This provision prohibits “status-based discrimination,” the
first of two categories of wrongful employer conduct condemned by Title
VII.13 The second category of wrongful employer conduct prohibited by Title
VII is employer retaliation against an employee who complains of
discrimination in the workplace.14 Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation
provides that an employer commits an unlawful employment practice when it
“discriminate[s] against any individual . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”15 Thus, while
status-based discrimination is direct discrimination based on an individual’s
protected status, retaliation is discrimination for complaining about statusbased discrimination.16
Prohibitions against retaliation are necessary to reinforce prohibitions
against status-based discrimination;17 indeed, “[t]he realities of retaliation in

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006). The full language of the provision is as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Id.
13. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522.
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The exact language of this provision is as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labormanagement committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,
including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a
labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id.
16. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
17. Individuals find it difficult to acknowledge that they have been discriminated against;
once they overcome that hurdle and recognize the discrimination, they then struggle with
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response to claiming discrimination necessitate strong legal protection from
retaliation if the law is to provide meaningful nondiscrimination guarantees.”18
Even the Supreme Court has noted the importance of antiretaliation provisions:
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who
are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses. “Plainly, effective
enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach
officials with their grievances.” Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to
provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon
19
which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.

Many Supreme Court decisions have in fact demonstrated the Supreme
Court’s willingness to interpret Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation in a
way that strengthens the prohibition against status-based discrimination.20 For
example, in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the
Supreme Court held that the “scope of the antiretaliation provision extends
beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”21
In that case, after the employee complained about workplace discrimination,
the employer changed the employee’s job responsibilities and suspended her

challenging the discrimination. One commentator has described the reluctance many individuals
face in first recognizing that they have been discriminated against:
As anyone who has experienced bias or prejudice knows, naming and challenging
discrimination is socially and psychologically difficult. By the time retaliation intervenes
to punish someone for alleging discrimination, that person has already overcome a myriad
of psychological and social forces operating to suppress that claim. Research in social
psychology has documented a marked reluctance among the targets of discrimination to
label and confront their experiences as such . . . . Retaliation performs important work in
institutions. One of the most palpable functions of retaliation is to suppress challenges to
perceived inequality. Retaliation performs much of this work without ever actually being
inflicted on the potential challenger. Decisions about whether to challenge discrimination
rest on a careful balancing of the costs and benefits of doing so.
Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25–26, 36 (2005). The fear of retaliation
will be discussed in relation to Title VII’s antiretaliation statute later in this Note. See infra Part
VI.
18. Brake, supra note 17, at 42.
19. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (citations omitted). The
Court further clarified:
The antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to
prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation
provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.
Id. at 63.
20. For a more in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s pro-plaintiff retaliation decisions,
see Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115 (2014).
21. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67.
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for multiple weeks without pay.22 Some courts had required employees to
demonstrate a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of
employment to succeed on a retaliation claim, but the Supreme Court
determined that any materially adverse employment action could constitute
retaliation as long as the action would dissuade a reasonable worker from
complaining about the discrimination.23 Moreover, in Thompson v. North
American Stainless, L.P., the Supreme Court held that a third party who never
complained of status-based discrimination but is the subject of retaliation after
a different individual complained of status-based discrimination can maintain a
retaliation claim under Title VII.24
Furthermore, not only has the Supreme Court broadened the scope of Title
VII’s antiretaliation provisions, it has also shown a willingness to view
retaliation as just another form of discrimination in other contexts beyond Title
VII.25 Indeed, even when statutes do not explicitly proscribe retaliation but do
proscribe status-based discrimination, the Supreme Court has determined that
the status-based discrimination prohibition within the statute implicitly
contains a prohibition against retaliation.26 In doing so, the Court has stated
that “[r]etaliation against a person because [he] has complained of . . .
discrimination is another form of intentional . . . discrimination.”27 Thus, in
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court determined that an
individual could bring a retaliation claim under Title IX, even though the
statute only explicitly prohibited sex discrimination.28 Moreover, in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., the Court held that a plaintiff could bring a
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens . . .
shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”29 In
Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, the Court held the federal-sector provision of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which provides that “[a]ll
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at
22. Id. at 58–59.
23. Id. at 60, 68.
24. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863, 868–70 (2011).
25. This jurisprudence was a key argument in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nassar. See infra
Part V. Indeed, when speculating about the outcome in Nassar, one commentator noted that the
decision would boil down to whether or not a majority of the justices would follow the line of
decisions that label retaliation as another form of discrimination. See Kevin Russell, Argument
Preview: Proving Retaliation Under Title VII, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 23, 2013, 5:06 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/argument-preview-proving-retaliation-under-title-vii/.
26. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 173–74.
29. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235 n.3, 237 (1969). Thus, a white
tenant could sue under the statute for retaliation he suffered after complaining about
discrimination towards his black tenant. Id. at 237.
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least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on
age,” also prohibited retaliation.30 And, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the
Court determined that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides that “[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens,” encompassed retaliation claims.31
Given the relatedness of Title VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation
provisions, the extent to which the broad interpretation of retaliation
strengthens the provision against status-based discrimination, and the history
of Supreme Court decisions defining retaliation as another form of
discrimination, one can easily understand Justice Ginsburg’s observation that
“the ban on discrimination and the ban on retaliation against a discrimination
complainant have traveled together.”32
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION STANDARD UNDER TITLE VII: PRICE
WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS
One continual point of contention under this framework has been the
correct standard of causation a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to prove
either status-based discrimination or retaliation when the employer considers
both legitimate and illegitimate, i.e., discriminatory, reasons in making an
employment decision.33 Fundamental to understanding the history and
complexity of the causation standard in these so-called “mixed-motive” cases
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.34 Indeed,
Price Waterhouse may be “[o]ne of the most important cases in Title VII
history.”35 No analysis of the Court’s decision in Nassar would be complete
without fully examining the Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse.

30. Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
31. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
33. This Note will deal exclusively with the causation standards under these “mixed-motive”
cases as opposed to pretext cases. A mixed-motive claim involves a situation where the employer
has in fact considered both illegitimate and legitimate reasons for making its employment
decision. A pretext claim, where the employer has not taken both illegitimate and legitimate
factors into consideration, is governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
34. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
35. Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most
Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s MotivatingFactor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (But Should), 64 ALA. L.
REV. 1067, 1075 (2013). “Not only did this case address burden shifting, gender stereotyping,
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In Price, a female employee at an accounting firm sued her employer for
sex discrimination when the firm refused to admit her as a partner.36 While
there were “clear signs” that partners at the firm “reacted negatively to [the
employee’s] personality because she was a woman,”37 the employer also
introduced evidence of her lack of interpersonal skills.38 The trial judge
concluded that even though the employer legitimately considered her lack of
interpersonal skills in its decision to deny her partner status, the trial judge held
that “[the employer] had unlawfully discriminated against [her] on the basis of
sex by consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments that
resulted from sex stereotyping.”39 Moreover, the judge found that because the
employer had not demonstrated that it would have denied her partner status
regardless of the discrimination, the employer could not avoid equitable
relief.40
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
court’s conclusion but determined that an employer could outright avoid Title
VII liability if it proved “by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.”41
The Supreme Court, recognizing a split among the circuits, granted
certiorari in the case to decide, in part, the proper standard of causation when
an employer’s adverse employment decision resulted from a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate motives.42 Doing so required the Court to interpret
the meaning of the words “because of” in Title VII’s provision against

direct evidence, and the meaning of ‘because of,’ it was also one of several cases that led to
Congress’s passing of the 1991 Act.” Id. (citations omitted).
36. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32.
37. Id. at 235 (“One partner described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she
‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school’.
Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those
partners objected to her swearing only ‘because it’s a lady using foul language.’ . . . [I]n order to
improve her chances for partnership, [one male partner] advised, [the female employee] should
‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.’” (citations omitted)).
38. Id. at 236.
39. Id. at 237.
40. Id.
41. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237. Thus, while the district court found that an employer
could avoid only equitable relief by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same employment decision regardless of the discrimination, the D.C. Circuit
determined that the employer could avoid liability by making that same showing. Id.
42. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court described the split in the lower courts that preceded its
decision in Price Waterhouse. See id. at 238 n.2. For a more in-depth discussion of the Title VII
causation standards before the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse, see Mark S. Brodin,
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
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discrimination.43 Although there was no majority opinion, six of the Justices
did agree that an employer acts “because of” a protected status when that status
is at least a motivating or substantial factor in taking an adverse employment
action.44
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the justices, began his analysis
by laying out the exact language of the statute and stated: “We take these
words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To
construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for
causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”45 Moreover, Justice Brennan
decisively determined that “because of” did not mean “solely because of,”
citing Congress’s rejection of an amendment that would have placed the word
“solely” before the words “because of” in the statute.46 This was demonstrative
evidence in his eyes that Congress intended to eliminate employment decisions
in which an illegitimate, discriminatory motive plays a part in an employment
decision, even if it is not the sole reason for the decision.47 Thus, he concluded
that “[w]hen . . . an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at
the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex.”48
The Court did not end the analysis there, however. The Court went on to
establish a burden-shifting framework, opening up the door for employers to
claim an affirmative defense even if an employee could show that a
discriminatory motive played a part in the employer’s decision.49 Thus, if the
employee demonstrated that the prohibited trait was a motivating factor in the
employment decision, the burden then shifted to the employer to demonstrate
that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of the

43. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. For the full language of the statute, see supra note
12.
44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 241 n.7.
47. Id. at 241. In response to the dissent’s criticism of Brennan’s construction of the words
“because of,” he stated:
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute. It is
difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words ‘because of,’ Congress meant to
obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate
motivations in the employment decision she challenges. We conclude, instead, that
Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based
considerations in coming to its decision.
Id. at 241–42.
48. Id. at 241.
49. Id. at 242.
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discrimination.50 If the employer could make this showing, it would escape
liability.51
The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, at least at first glance,
did grant some protection to employees by allowing them to only demonstrate
that their protected status was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.52
However, Price Waterhouse also allowed the employer to escape all liability if
it could demonstrate that it would have made the same decision regardless of
the discriminatory motive.53 In the eyes of Congress, such a decision unduly
restricted the protections guaranteed under Title VII.54
III. CONGRESS REACTS: CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 BUT PRICE WATERHOUSE
SURVIVES
A.

Congress Extends Protection under the Civil Rights Act of 1991

In response to Price Waterhouse and a number of other Supreme Court
decisions “that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness” of
antidiscrimination laws,55 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the
1991 Act).56 Indeed, the purpose of the 1991 Act was to provide “additional
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.”57 The 1991 Act
codified part of the framework of Price Waterhouse and discarded the rest.58
Specifically, the legislation added a new subsection, § 2000e-2(m), to the

50. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (White, J., concurring).
51. Id. Justice Brennan stated the new standard as follows:
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability
only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2–4 (1991).
55. Id. Some of the other decisions overruled by the 1991 Act included Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 guaranteeing all
persons “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens”
does not prohibit racial harassment on the job and other forms of race discrimination occurring
after the formation of a contract), and Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986)
(holding that a party prevailing in a Title VII suit against the Government was not entitled to
interest on attorney’s fees because the provision permitting attorney’s fees did not expressly
waive sovereign immunity). See id.
56. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071. For a more in-depth
discussion on the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The
Impact of The Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. CITY. U. L.
REV. 475 (1993).
57. § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071.
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2).
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section governing status-based discrimination.59 The new provision stated:
“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”60 Therefore, the employee need only demonstrate that
the prohibited status was a motivating factor in the employment decision.61
Although the amendment saved the motivating-factor standard, the
legislation removed the ability of the employer to escape liability by
demonstrating that it would have made the employment decision regardless of
any discriminatory animus.62 Instead, Congress enacted § 2000e-5(g)(2), which
provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e–2(m)
of this title and [the employer] demonstrates that [it] would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the
court . . . may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and [limited]
attorney’s fees and costs . . . and . . . shall not award damages or issue an order
63
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.

Thus, under both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act’s amendments, an
employee claiming discrimination under Title VII must only demonstrate that
the employee’s protected status was a motivating factor in the employer’s
adverse employment decision.64 However, while an employer could avoid
liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision
regardless of the discrimination under Price Waterhouse, the 1991 Act’s
amendments provided that an employer’s demonstration that it would have
made the same decision absent a discriminatory motive would only lessen
damages.65
Key to the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Nassar was Congress’s
decision to codify, at least in part, the decision in Price Waterhouse by adding
the motivating-factor standards to the subsection of Title VII governing statusbased discrimination claims and not in a subsection governing Title VII
retaliation claims or a neutral Title VII subsection governing both types of
Title VII claims.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 2000e-2(m). The prohibition against retaliation is in id. § 2000e-3.
Id. § 2000e-2(m).
See id.
See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
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Causation Standard for Retaliation Claims: Price Waterhouse or the 1991
Act?

After Congress enacted the 1991 Act, courts disagreed regarding which
standard governed Title VII retaliation claims.66 Some courts applied the 1991
Act’s motivating-factor framework, while other courts determined that the
1991 Act did not apply and instead used the Price Waterhouse framework.
The majority of courts continued to apply the Price Waterhouse
framework to Title VII retaliation claims. For example, in Tanca v. Nordberg,
the First Circuit rejected the employee’s contention that the 1991 Act’s
motivating-factor framework applied to Title VII retaliation claims, observing
that the 1991 Act’s motivating-factor provision did not explicitly refer to
retaliation claims.67 Thus, the court determined that Price Waterhouse still
applied to Title VII retaliation claims.68
Some courts, however, did begin to apply the 1991 Act’s motivating-factor
framework to Title VII retaliation claims, though these cases lacked a clear
analysis of why the 1991 Act applied. For example, the Seventh Circuit
appeared to suggest in Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc. that the 1991 Act’s
motivating-framework governed Title VII retaliation claims, but the court
never engaged in a thorough analysis regarding the 1991 Act’s applicability
versus Price Waterhouse’s applicability.69
IV. CAUSATION REVISITED: GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
A.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and the Resurgence of But-For
Causation

The Supreme Court, in deciding Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,70
added another wrinkle to the already confusing area of causation standards in
retaliation claims. In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that plaintiffs claiming
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) must show that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse
employment action.71

66. For a more in-depth analysis of the circuit split following the 1991 Act, see Rosenthal,
supra note 35, at 1069–73.
67. Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 680–82 (1st Cir. 1996).
68. Id. at 683.
69. Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 892–94 (7th Cir. 1996).
70. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
71. Id. at 169–70, 177. The relevant provision of the ADEA provides: “It shall be unlawful
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
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In Gross, the plaintiff-employee had worked for the defendant-employer
for about thirty years when he was given the position of claims administrator in
2001.72 Two years later, when the employee was fifty-four years old, the
company restructured the employee’s job and transferred many of his job
responsibilities to a newly created position held by a younger employee.73 The
employer asserted various legitimate reasons for the restructuring of the
employee’s position,74 but the employee, viewing his new position as a
demotion, filed suit against the employer for violating the ADEA.75
At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury to find for the
employee if he had demonstrated that his age had been a motivating factor in
the employer’s decision to demote him.76 The trial court further instructed,
however, that the jury must find for the employer if it had proven that it would
have made the same decision regardless of the employee’s age.77 The jury
returned a verdict for the employee, and the employer appealed.78
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, construing the
appropriate standards of Price Waterhouse, found that the trial court had not
given the proper jury instructions.79 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit determined
that under Price Waterhouse, the employee must present direct evidence
demonstrating that his age actually motivated the adverse employment

72. Gross, 557 U.S. at 170.
73. Id.
74. Id. At trial, the employer defended its position by providing evidence that the
employee’s transfer to the new position was part of an overall corporate restructuring and that the
new position was better suited to the employee’s skills. Id.
75. Id. Although Gross dealt with a discrimination claim under the ADEA and not Title VII,
courts deciding cases involving retaliation claims under Title VII after Gross was decided used
Gross to establish a but-for causation standard for the retaliation claims as well. See infra Part IVB. Moreover, the Supreme Court used the reasoning in Gross when deciding Nassar. See infra
Part V.
76. Id. at 170–71.
77. Gross, 557 U.S. at 171. The instructions, in part, were as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if all the following elements have been proved by the
preponderance of the evidence: . . . [The] plaintiff’s age was a motivating factor in
defendant’s decision to demote plaintiff. However, your verdict must be for defendant . . .
if it has been proved by the preponderance of the evidence that defendant would have
demoted plaintiff regardless of his age. . . . As used in these instructions, plaintiff’s age
was a motivating factor, if plaintiff’s age played a part or a role in the defendant’s
decision to demote plaintiff. However, plaintiff’s age need not have been the only reason
for defendant’s decision to demote plaintiff.
Id. at 192 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). To compare this
instruction with the standards in Price Waterhouse, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
78. Gross, 557 U.S. at 171 (majority opinion).
79. Id.
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decision.80 Absent such a showing, the burden never shifted to the employer to
demonstrate that it would have taken the same decision regardless of the
discrimination.81 Thus, because the trial court’s instructions allowed the burden
to shift to the employer upon the employee presenting any category of
evidence showing his age was a motivating factor, the trial improperly
construed Price Waterhouse.82 Moreover, because the employee conceded that
he had not presented any direct evidence, the Eighth Circuit determined that
the trial court should not have even given the mixed-motive instruction but
should have instead instructed the jury “only to determine whether [the
employee] had carried his burden of ‘prov[ing] that age was the determining
factor in FBL’s employment action.’”83 The employee appealed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.84
Although the Court acknowledged that “[t]he question presented by the
petitioner in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a suit
brought under the [ADEA],”85 the Court instead decided to answer whether a
mixed-motive instruction is even allowed in ADEA discrimination cases,
noting that it could not answer the former question without having answered
the latter question.86 The Court began by stating that “Title VII is materially
different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion,” and, therefore,

80. Id. at 172.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Gross, 557 U.S. at 172–73 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 173.
85. Id. at 169–70.
86. Id. at 173. “Although the parties did not specifically frame the question to include this
threshold inquiry, ‘[t]he statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein.’” Id. at 173 n.1 (citation omitted). The dissent was
particularly disturbed by the “majority’s inattention to prudential Court practices” in even
answering the mixed-motive instruction question, stating:
The Court asks whether a mixed-motives instruction is ever appropriate in an ADEA case.
As it acknowledges, this was not the question we granted certiorari to decide. Instead, the
question arose for the first time in respondent’s brief, which asked us to “overrule Price
Waterhouse with respect to its application to the ADEA.” In the usual course, this Court
would not entertain such a request raised only in a merits brief: “We would normally
expect notice of an intent to make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent’s
opposition to a petition for certiorari, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those
likely affected and wishing to participate.” Yet the Court is unconcerned that the question
it chooses to answer has not been briefed by the parties or interested amici curiae. Its
failure to consider the views of the United States, which represents the agency charged
with administering the ADEA, is especially irresponsible.
Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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decisions that construe Title VII, including Price Waterhouse, do not control
its construction of the ADEA.87 The Court continued:
This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework applies to
ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now. When conducting statutory
interpretation, we “must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.” Unlike
Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish
88
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.

Moreover, the Court noted that while Congress amended Title VII to
provide for a motivating-factor standard, it neglected to add a similar provision
to the ADEA, even though it chose to amend the ADEA in other ways at the
same time.89 The Court determined that it could not “ignore” Congress’s
decision to not add the motivating-factor provision to the ADEA, reasoning,
“When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is
presumed to have acted intentionally.”90
Having established that cases construing Title VII did not apply in this
context, the Court turned to the actual text of the ADEA and, as it did in Price
Waterhouse, narrowed in on the meaning of the words “because of.”91 This
time, however, after examining dictionary definitions of the word “because,”
the Court determined that “because of” means “[b]y reason of; on account of,”
and, therefore, that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an
employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that
the employer decided to act.”92 Given the “ordinary meaning” of the ADEA’s
provision, the Court concluded that the plaintiff must establish that age was the
but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action in order to prevail on an ADEA
discrimination claim.93
The Court concluded by rejecting the employee’s argument that Price
Waterhouse controlled the Court’s interpretation, arguing that the Price
87. Id. at 173 (majority opinion).
88. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393
(2008)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 176.
92. Id. Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s new interpretation:
We were no doubt aware that dictionaries define “because of” as “by reason of” or “on
account of.” Contrary to the majority’s bald assertion, however, this does not establish
that the term denotes but-for causation. The dictionaries the Court cites do not, for
instance, define “because of” as “solely by reason of” or “exclusively on account of.” In
Price Waterhouse, we recognized that the words “because of” do not mean “solely
because of,” and we held that the inquiry “commanded by the words” of the statute was
whether gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision.
Id. at 183 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
93. Gross, 557 U.S. at 177 (majority opinion).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR

911

Waterhouse approach was difficult to apply and may not even be doctrinally
sound.94 Thus, the Court concluded:
We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the
ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “butfor” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of
persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the
action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence
95
that age was one motivating factor in that decision.

Justice Stevens, in his dissent, focused his argument on the Court’s
analysis in Price Waterhouse, noting that it construed the identical “because
of” language of Title VII to imply that the text “proscribes adverse
employment actions motived in whole or in part by the age of the employee.”96
He further chastised the majority for interpreting the words “because of” under
the ADEA “as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation,” an interpretation
the Court in Price Waterhouse had squarely rejected.97 Moreover, Justice
Stevens rejected the notion that cases construing Title VII had no weight to the
case at hand, stating, “The relevant language in the two statutes is identical,
and we have long recognized that our interpretations of Title VII’s language
apply with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive
provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.”98
Justice Stevens also reasoned that Congress’s reaction to Price
Waterhouse, in enacting the 1991 Act, actually supported the notion that
“because of” should not be interpreted to mean “but-for causation,” noting that
Congress actually codified Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor standard and
rejected the but-for causation standard advocated by Price Waterhouse’s
dissent.99 Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, given that courts have
consistently held that Title VII cases apply to cases involving the ADEA, even
if the motivating-factor standard within the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title
94. Id. at 178–79. Interestingly, in his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the “but-for”
causation standard was not free of its own defects in the employment context, noting: “In a case
where we characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple motives . . . to
apply ‘but-for’ causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened
if the employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different.” Id. at 191 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). For a more in depth discussion of Justice Breyer’s critique of the but-for standard, see
infra Part VI.
95. Id. at 180 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 183.
98. Gross, 557 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
99. Id. at 185. Justice Steven’s later stated, “The Court’s resurrection of the but-for causation
standard is unwarranted. Price Waterhouse repudiated that standard 20 years ago, and Congress’
response to our decision further militates against the crabbed interpretation the Court adopts
today.” Id. at 187.
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VII may not apply to the ADEA,100 the Price Waterhouse interpretation of
“because of” should still govern.101
B.

Causation in Title VII Retaliation Claims After Gross: Gross, Price
Waterhouse, or the 1991 Act?

The Gross decision was met with some contempt.102 In fact, a bill was
introduced in Congress to overturn Gross.103 The bill, Protecting Older
Workers Against Discrimination Act, was never enacted,104 however, and
courts were left to interpret how far-reaching of an effect the majority’s
analysis in Gross would have on retaliation claims under Title VII.
Although Gross construed the ADEA, many courts began to apply Gross
in the Title VII context. In fact, the majority of courts faced with Title VII
retaliation claims used Gross to hold that Title VII required the employee to
demonstrate that his protected activity was the but-for cause of the employer’s
adverse employment action.105
The minority approach taken by the courts after Gross was decided was to
apply Price Waterhouse to retaliation claims. For example, in Smith v. Xerox
Corporation, the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that Gross required the
court to adopt a but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims.106
The Fifth Circuit argued that Gross did not apply because it involved the
ADEA and not Title VII.107 Thus, the court relied on Price Waterhouse to
determine that the employee only had to show that her protected activity was a
100. The dissent noted that there may actually be good reason to think that the 1991
amendments to Title VII should apply to the ADEA as well:
There is, however, some evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixed-motives
amendments to apply to the ADEA as well. See H.R. Rep., pt. 2, at 4 (noting that a
“number of other laws banning discrimination, including . . . the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., are modeled after and have been
interpreted in a manner consistent with Title VII,” and that “these other laws modeled
after Title VII [should] be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as
amended by this Act,” including the mixed-motives provisions).
Id. at 186 n.6.
101. Id. at 186–87.
102. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 69 (2010) (responding to the Gross decision).
103. See Andrew Kenny, The Meaning of “Because” in Employment Discrimination Law:
Causation in Title VII Retaliation Cases After Gross, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2011)
(discussing the proposed amendment).
104. Id.
105. For a discussion of the cases that used Gross to establish a but-for causation standard for
Title VII retaliation claims, see Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1100–05.
106. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 2010). Nassar also came out of the
Fifth Circuit.
107. Id. at 329.
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motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.108 If the
employee made that showing, the Fifth Circuit determined, the employer could
then avoid liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same
decision absent the retaliatory motive.109 Judge Jolly dissented, arguing that
Gross controlled and that the proper standard for retaliation claims was the
but-for causation.110
Only three years after Smith was decided, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Nassar to resolve the split and decide the proper standard of
causation for Title VII retaliation claims.
V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR
A.

Facts of University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (“University”) is an
academic institution which specializes in medical education.111 In an effort to
give its students hands-on experience at healthcare facilities, the University
had affiliated itself with a number of hospitals, including Parkland Memorial
Hospital (“Hospital”).112 The affiliation agreement between the University and
the Hospital provided that the Hospital would offer the University’s faculty
members empty staff physician positions at the Hospital.113 Under this
framework, Naiel Nassar, a doctor of Middle Eastern descent, was hired to
work both as an assistant professor at the University and as a staff physician in
the infectious disease division of the Hospital.114
In 2004, Dr. Beth Levine became Nassar’s ultimate supervisor when she
was hired as the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine.115 After
being hired, Levine began criticizing Nassar’s billing practices and
productivity and made comments to the effect that “Middle Easterners are

108. Id. at 330.
109. Id. at 333.
110. Id. at 336 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Judge Jolly stated:
[T]he majority effectively creates an unnecessary split in the circuits by failing properly to
apply the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. As the Seventh
Circuit has correctly reasoned, without statutory language indicating otherwise, the
mixed-motive analysis is no longer applicable outside of Title VII discrimination, and
consequently does not apply to this retaliation case.
Id.
111. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Nassar was first employed in 1995 but resigned his positions in 1998 to attend more
schooling. Id. In 2001, he was rehired to work again as both a faculty member and staff
physician. Id.
115. Id.
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lazy.”116 Nassar felt that Levine’s actions were a result of a bias against him
because of his religion and ethnicity.117 After meeting several times to
complain of Levine’s harassment with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the University’s Chair
of Internal Medicine, Nassar began to consider ways to continue to work at the
Hospital without being subject to Levine’s supervision.118 To this end, Nassar
inquired whether the Hospital would be willing to employ him regardless of
whether he was a faculty member of the University.119 When the Hospital
indicated it would, Nassar resigned his position at the University and, in a
letter to Fitz, cited Levine’s harassment and discrimination as the catalyst for
his resignation.120
Fitz, having expressed his concern over the humiliation the letter had
caused Levine and the need to “publicly exonerat[e]” her, appealed to the
Hospital to rescind its offer of employment to Nassar.121 Fitz argued that the
affiliation agreement required the Hospital to offer staff positions to University
faculty, and, as such, any offer to Nassar was barred by the agreement.122 In
response to the opposition, the Hospital withdrew its offer of employment.123
B.

Procedural Posture

As a result of these events, Nassar filed a suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas.124 Nassar alleged that Levine’s
harassment led to his constructive discharge, and, thus, the University had
discriminated against him on the basis of his race, religion, and national
origin—a status-based discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII.125
Nassar further alleged that the University had retaliated against him for
complaining about Levine’s harassment—a retaliation claim under § 2000e3(a) of Title VII.126 After a trial, the jury found for Nassar on both the statusbased and retaliation claims, awarding him $400,000 in backpay and over $3
116. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2523–24.
120. Id. at 2524. The letter read in part:
The primary reason of my resignation is the continuing harassment and discrimination
against me by the Infectious Diseases division chief, Dr. Beth Levine . . . . I have been
threatened with denial of promotion, loss of salary support and potentially loss of my
job[.] . . . [This treatment] stems from [Levine’s] religious, racial and cultural bias against
Arabs and Muslims that has resulted in a hostile work environment.
Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2012).
121. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524.
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million in compensatory damages.127 The district court reduced the
compensatory damages to $300,000 and entered judgment.128
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part
and vacated in part.129 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that Nassar had not
demonstrated sufficient evidence that Levine’s harassment and discrimination
resulted in his constructive discharge.130 Thus, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
entry of judgment in favor of Nassar on the status-based discrimination
claim.131 The Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the decision in favor of Nassar
on the retaliation claim.132 The Fifth Circuit first noted that the required proof
for a Title VII retaliation claim is less demanding than a constructive discharge
claim.133 The Fifth Circuit then qualified that its review was limited.
Specifically, the court observed that it only needed to determine that “the
record contains sufficient evidence . . . that [the employer’s] stated reason for
[taking adverse employment action against the employee] was pretext or that,
while true, was only one reason for their being fired, and race was another
motivating factor.”134 Thus, even though the University argued that “Fitz
thwarted Nassar’s prospective employment at Parkland as a routine application
of [its] rights under [its] affiliation agreement,” the Fifth Circuit found that
Nassar had offered sufficient proof that a motivating factor in Fitz’s opposition
of the offer of employment was Nassar’s complaint about Levine.135
Importantly, the University had argued in its Brief on Appeal that the
district court erred in instructing the jury on a mixed-motive theory of
retaliation.136 Instead of addressing the argument in the text of its opinion,
however, the Fifth Circuit devoted only three sentences to the argument in a
footnote, stating the mixed-motive causation argument was foreclosed by its
decision in Smith.137
The University subsequently filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc.138 In the opinion denying the petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc, some of the Fifth Circuit judges outlined their views regarding the
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012).
130. Id. at 453.
131. Id. at 456.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 454.
134. Nassar, 674 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 456 n.16.
137. Id. The footnote read in part, “UTSW also urges error based on the jury having been
instructed on a mixed-motive theory of retaliation. UTSW concedes that its argument is
foreclosed by our decision in Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir.2010). We
therefore find no error in the jury instructions.” Id.
138. See Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012).
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causation argument.139 Specifically, Judge Elrod, in her concurring opinion,
argued that the University had waived the mixed-motive causation argument at
the trial level.140 In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Smith vehemently
argued that the Fifth Circuit should overturn the decision in Smith because it
was an erroneous interpretation of the statute regarding the causation
standard.141 In his opinion, the case presented the perfect vehicle to resolve the
conflict regarding the appropriate causation standard for retaliation claims
under Title VII.142
The University then filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.143 The
Supreme Court must have agreed with Judge Smith that Nassar represented the
perfect vehicle to resolve the conflict, as it granted certiorari on January 18,
2013.144
C. Majority Opinion
1.

The Motivating-Factor Provision Does Not Apply to Retaliation
Claims

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began the analysis by discussing
the ordinary but-for standard for causation found in usual tort claims.145
Because the ordinary but-for standard is the “background against which
Congress legislated in enacting Title VII,” the Court presumed that Congress
intended to incorporate the usual causation standard “absent an indication to
the contrary in the statute itself.”146
Having determined the proper framework, the Court then proceeded to
discuss the judicial and legislative attempts to define the causation requirement
under Title VII, including its decision in Price Waterhouse and Congress’s
response in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.147 In discussing the 1991 Act’s
addition of § 2000e-2(m) to Title VII, the Court admitted that Congress clearly
legislated the proper standard for status-based discrimination claims under
§2000e-2.148 Thus, status-based discrimination claims under Title VII are in
fact governed by the lesser causation standard that requires the employee to

139. Id. at 211–12.
140. Id. at 212 (Elrod, J., concurring). Judge Elrod found that the University had failed to
raise a timely objection to the jury instruction and that the University had originally drafted its
own jury instruction to include a motivating-factor standard. Id. at 211.
141. Id. at 212–13 (Smith, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 213.
143. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2013).
144. Id.
145. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013).
146. Id. at 2525.
147. Id. at 2525–26.
148. Id. at 2526.
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show that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was only a motivating
factor in the employment action.149
The Court next discussed its decision in Gross, noting that while Gross
arose under the ADEA and not Title VII, the “particular confines of Gross
[did] not deprive it of all persuasive force.”150 In fact, the Court stated that
Gross provided “two insights” as it interpreted the term “because” in relation
to causation and it demonstrated the significance of the structural choices in
Title VII and the 1991 Act’s provisions.151
With this background in mind, the Court proceeded to analyze whether the
1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII establishing the proper standard of
causation for status-based claims also applied to retaliation claims under Title
VII.152 The Court concluded that it did not and instead decided that, “[g]iven
the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the text in [Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision] and the [statute] in Gross, the proper conclusion, as in
Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to
retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”153
The Court then focused on dispelling the contention that Title VII
retaliation claims should be governed by the motivating-factor standard in §
2000e-2(m) and treated the same as Title VII status-based discrimination
claims, arguing that: (1) the plain language of § 2000e-2(m) applied only to
status-based discrimination claims, (2) the design and structure of § 2000e2(m) demonstrated that it applied only to status-based discrimination claims,
and (3) there was no general rule that the Court treats bans on status-based
discrimination as bans on retaliation when interpreting federal
antidiscrimination laws.154
The Court first argued that the “plain language” of § 2000e-2(m) did not
support an assertion that it applied to retaliation claims.155 Despite the fact that
§ 2000e-2(m) began by stating “an unlawful unemployment practice is
established when,” and Title VII defined retaliation as an unlawful
employment practice, the Court stated that § 2000e-2(m) did not actually
extend to all unlawful employment practices under Title VII.156 Because §

149. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
150. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527.
151. Id. at 2527–28.
152. Id. at 2529. See supra Part III (discussing the 1991 Act and its amendments to Title VII).
153. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. See supra notes 15 and 71 for the full text of these
provisions.
154. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528–29.
155. Id. at 2528.
156. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). As stated previously, the full text of this
provision is as follows: “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id.
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2000e-2(m) also referred to the status-based discrimination actions, the Court
concluded that the reference represented “Congress’ intent to confine that
provision’s coverage to only those types of employment practices.”157 Thus,
even though the beginning of the provision applied to “an” unlawful
unemployment practice, because the statute did not outright state that it applied
to retaliation, the Court found it would be “improper to conclude that what
Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.”158
The Court next argued that interpreting § 2000e-2(m) as applying to Title
VII retaliation claims would ignore Congress’s ability to design the provision
and choose its structure.159 Congress’s choice in structuring a statute should be
presumed to be deliberate, the Court argued, and, thus, by including § 2000e2(m) in the section prohibiting status-based discrimination and not in the
section prohibiting retaliation or in a section that exclusively applied to both
claims, Congress intended § 2000e-2(m) to only apply to status-based
discrimination claims.160 Further, the Court found it relevant that a different
portion of the 1991 Act contained an express reference to all unlawful
employment actions.161 If it wanted the motivating-factor standard to apply to
both status-based and retaliation claims, the Court argued, Congress would
have used the same express language.162
In its last refutation to the claim that § 2000e-2(m) applied to retaliation
claims, the Court addressed the argument that its precedent treated prohibitions
against status-based discrimination as a general prohibition against retaliation
as well when interpreting federal anti-discrimination statutes.163 Though the
Court admitted that its decisions in CBOCS, Gomez, and Jackson stated “the
general proposition that Congress’s enactment of a broadly phrased
antidiscrimination statute may signal a concomitant intent to ban retaliation . . .
even where the statute does not refer to retaliation in so many words,” the
Court determined that those cases were not controlling because the laws in
those cases were broad general bans on discrimination while Title VII was a
precise, complex, and exhaustive statute.164 In other words, “[the] fundamental
difference in statutory structure render[ed] inapposite decisions which treated

157. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2529.
160. Id.
161. Id. (“The relevant portion of the 1991 Act, § 109(b), allowed certain overseas operations
by U.S. employers to engage in ‘any practice prohibited by section 703 or 704,’ i.e., § 2000e–2 or
§ 2000e–3, ‘if compliance with such section would cause such employer . . . to violate the law of
the foreign country in which such workplace is located.” (citation omitted)).
162. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2530.
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retaliation as an implicit corollary of status-based discrimination.”165
Therefore, in the Court’s estimation, references to status-based discrimination
were not always to be treated as synonyms for retaliation.166
2.

Need of Judicial Resources Demands a Stricter Standard for
Retaliation Claims

In support of its decision to apply the stricter but-for standard to retaliation
claims under Title VII, the Court next launched into a judicial efficiency
argument.167 In the Court’s view, the proper interpretation of the causation
standard for retaliation claims had “central importance” to the fair and
responsible allocation of judicial resources, especially given the growth of
retaliation claims in recent years.168 Citing Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) statistics as evidence of this growth, the Court noted that
the number of retaliation claims exceeded those for every type of status-based
discrimination except race.169 Thus, if the Court allowed a motiving-factor
standard, the number of frivolous claims could increase and divert resources
away from genuine efforts to combat discrimination.170
3.

Refusal to Give Deference to EEOC or Price

Even though the EEOC guidelines clearly stated that retaliation claims
could be shown using the lesser motivating-factor standard, the Court refused
to give the EEOC’s interpretation deference because, in the Court’s opinion,
the EEOC’s explanations for its interpretation of the proper causation standard
for retaliation claims “lack the persuasive force that is a necessary precondition
to deference.”171 The EEOC had first defended its interpretation on the theory
that retaliation claims had consistently been governed under the same
causation standard as status-based discrimination claims, stating “Courts have
long held that the evidentiary framework for proving [status-based]
discrimination . . . also applies to claims of discrimination based on
retaliation.”172 The Court rejected this explanation, however, noting that it
failed “to address the particular interplay among the status-based
discrimination provision (§ 2000e–2(a)), the antiretaliation provision (§
2000e–3(a)), and the motivating-factor provision (§ 2000e–2(m)).”173
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2530–31.
167. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2531–32.
171. Id. at 2533.
172. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. For further understanding of the EEOC’s position, see 2
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8(E)(1) (May 20, 1998).
173. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533.
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The EEOC’s second explanation for its interpretation was that “an
interpretation . . . that permits proven retaliation to go unpunished undermines
the purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions of maintaining unfettered access
to the statutory remedial mechanism.”174 The Court rejected this explanation as
well, however, stating that the reasoning was “circular” because it assumed
what causal relationship must be shown in order to prove retaliation.175
Finally, the Court refused to apply the Price Waterhouse standard, even
though the Court admitted that the case expressly interpreted causation under
Title VII.176 In the Court’s estimation, Congress displaced the entire Price
Waterhouse standard when it adopted the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title
VII.177 Further, the Court found that applying Price Waterhouse would be
inconsistent with Gross’s interpretation of the word “because.”178
D. Dissent Disagrees
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, began
her dissent by also describing the two different types of discrimination under
Title VII—status-based claims and retaliation claims.179 Instead of sweepingly
discussing the two claims as the majority did, however, Ginsburg set out the
statutory language which created each claim and made a point to emphasize
the similarity in the language of both subsections.180 Specifically, Ginsburg
emphasized that both subsections made it an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against an employee because of certain protected traits or
activities.181 In doing so, Ginsburg set the foundation for her argument: statusbased discrimination and retaliation claims were “twin safeguards” that should
require the same causation standard.182

174. Id.
175. Id. at 2533–34.
176. Id. at 2534.
177. Id.
178. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
179. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180. Id. Justice Ginsburg puts her own emphasis on the word “because” in both subsections.
Thus, she states:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . makes it an ‘“unlawful employment practice”
to “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” § 2000e–2(a) (emphasis added). Backing up that core
provision, Title VII also makes it an “unlawful employment practice” to discriminate
against any individual “because” the individual has complained of, opposed, or
participated in a proceeding about, prohibited discrimination. § 2000e–3(a) (emphasis
added).
Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2535.
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History of Treating Status-Based Claims and Retaliation Claims
Together

Ginsburg first noted that the two Title VII claims had “traveled
together”—plaintiffs often raised the two claims in tandem and the Court had
regularly interpreted them similarly.183 Indeed, in Ginsburg’s estimation, by
establishing a rule that “drives a wedge between” the two claims, the majority
decision broke with the principle that the Supreme Court’s Title VII
jurisprudence made clear: “Retaliation for complaining about discrimination is
tightly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be disassociated from it.
Indeed, [the Supreme] Court has explained again and again that ‘retaliation in
response to a complaint about [proscribed] discrimination is
discrimination.’”184
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Supreme Court precedent
supported the “symbiotic relationship” between the prohibition against
discrimination and the prohibition against retaliation.185 Prohibitions against
rehabilitation, she noted, helped reinforce the purpose of prohibitions against
status-based discrimination by making sure that employers did not unlawfully
interfere with an individual’s efforts to secure the protections afforded them
under such status-based prohibitions.186 Without protections from retaliation,
the antidiscrimination provisions within Title VII have no real sting, as
employees would not feel free to air their grievances.187 Thus, she argued,
effective enforcement of proscriptions on status-based discrimination depended
on a strong and effective proscription on retaliation.188
Given the relationship between status-based discrimination and retaliation,
Ginsburg noted that the Supreme Court had consistently held—until the
majority’s decision in Nassar—that a ban on discrimination encompassed
retaliation.189 In supporting her claim, Ginsburg examined the different cases
that unequivocally established that retaliation was discrimination; she then

183. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2537.
186. Id.
187. Id. In other words, if employees bear a heavy burden in establishing a violation of the
retaliation provision, employees will be less likely to speak up regarding discrimination. Thus,
requiring a tougher but-for causation standard for retaliation claims will have the effect of
actually lessening the force of a strong prohibition against discrimination. Therefore, applying the
same standard of causation for both retaliation and status-based claims actually comports with the
purpose of the act in protecting against discrimination. Such protection, furthermore, was the
intent with which Congress enacted the motivating-factor standard in the 1991 Act. See infra Part
VI.
188. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
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concluded that there was no “sound reason” to stray from the precedent
established in those cases.190
Beyond discussing the Supreme Court precedent that had consistently
treated retaliation as a form of discrimination, Justice Ginsburg also argued
that legislative intent regarding the codification of the motivating-factor
causation standard also demonstrated that claims for retaliation and claims for
status-based discrimination were designed to be tested under the same
analysis.191 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the 1991 Amendment was intended to
add additional protections against discrimination and to respond to Supreme
Court decisions that had limited the effectiveness of the antidiscrimination
laws.192 One such decision that Congress was concerned about was Price
Waterhouse, as the Supreme Court had concluded that an employer could
avoid liability under Title VII by demonstrating that it would have taken the
same employment action regardless of the discriminatory motive.193 In Justice
Ginsburg’s eyes, Congress had actually endorsed the Court’s finding in Price
Waterhouse that the discrimination need only be a motivating factor in an
adverse employment decision in order for an employer to be liable under Title
VII; Congress detested, however, the provision of Price Waterhouse that
allowed an employer to avoid liability by demonstrating that it would have
made the decision regardless of the discrimination.194
Thus, Congress made clear that its amendment was designed to establish a
motivating-factor standard for discrimination claims—an attempt, Justice
Ginsburg noted, to “restore” the rule several courts had followed that placed
liability on employers when discrimination actually played a role in making an
adverse employment decision.195 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
the rule Congress attempted to restore had been applied to both status-based
claims and retaliation claims under Title VII.196 In fact, the Congressional
Report discussing the amendment cited with approval the decision in Bibbs v.
Block, which held that an employer violated Title VII when an unlawful
motive played some party in the employment decision.197 The holdings of
Biggs, even before the enactment of the 1991 Act, had been applied to
establish claims of retaliation, not just claims of status-based discrimination.198
Thus, given the clear congressional intent to strengthen the protections of Title
VII and its approval of decisions applying the motivating-factor standard to
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 2537–38.
See id. at 2539.
Id. 2538.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538.
Id. at 2539.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323–24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2539 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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claims of retaliation, Justice Ginsburg concluded that there was “scant reason
to think that . . . Congress meant to exclude retaliation claims from the newly
enacted ‘motivating factor’ provision.”199
Moreover, in Justice Ginsburg’s estimation, the placement of the provision
that the majority found to be conclusive evidence of Congress’s intent to limit
the motivating-factor standard to status-based discrimination claims may not
have been so conclusive after all.200 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg argued that by
not placing the framework in a provision that dealt specifically and exclusively
with status-based discrimination claims, Congress actually made clear that the
new provision was not limited to status-based claims.201 Further evidence that
Congress intended the provision to apply equally to both claims, Justice
Ginsburg argued, was that the new provision clearly stated that it encompassed
“any employment practice.”202
2.

Implications of the Majority’s Decision

As noted earlier, Ginsburg also took aim at the majority’s decision by
noting its total lack of forethought to the effect it would have on trial judges
left to figure out how to properly determine violations of the prohibition
against retaliation, especially given the fact that retaliation claims were almost
always joined by claims of status-based discrimination.203 In Ginsburg’s own
words, “[t]he Court shows little regard for the trial judges who will be obliged
to charge discrete causation standards when a claim of discrimination ‘because
of,’ e.g., race is coupled with a claim of discrimination ‘because’ the individual
has complained of race discrimination.”204 Indeed, even jurors “will puzzle
over the rhyme or reason for the dual standards.”205
Of “graver concern” to Ginsburg, however, was the effect the Court had on
a provision designed to strengthen Title VII protections, not limit them.206
Ginsburg lamented that “the Court has seized on a provision . . . adopted by
Congress as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title VII, and turned it into a
measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”207

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 2539–40.
Id. at 2539.
Id. (citation omitted).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS: THE MOTIVATING-FACTOR STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN
RETALIATION CLAIMS
The Supreme Court, in granting certiorari in Nassar, had the chance to
solidify and strengthen the relationship between Title VII’s status-based
discrimination statue and its retaliation statute. Instead of determining that
retaliation claims can be proven under the lesser motivating-factor framework
allowed for status-based discrimination claims, however, the Court
unnecessarily differentiated between the two types of discrimination and held
that retaliation claims must proceed under the but-for causation standard.208 In
doing so, the Court unduly burdened employees and created a pointless hurdle
to succeeding on Title VII retaliation claims. Indeed, the Supreme Court
should have allowed Title VII retaliation claims to enjoy the same motivingfactor causation standard that governs status-based discrimination claims under
Title VII.
Specifically, the Court in Nassar reached the wrong result for the
following three reasons: 1) the majority’s reasoning rested on incomplete and
unfounded conclusions, 2) the but-for causation standard will be difficult to
prove and even harder for jurors to apply, and 3) the purpose and policy behind
Title VII’s antiretaliation statute call for a lesser causation standard.
A.

The Majority’s Reasoning Was Incomplete and Unfounded
1.

“Because of” Does Not Require But-For Causation

Contrary to the majority’s assertion, “because of,” at least as it is used in
Title VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation statutes, does not mean
“solely because of.” Instead of looking to cues from Congress to help interpret
the language of the statute, the majority looked to Gross and its reliance on
dictionary definitions in determining what Congress meant when it used the
words “because of” in Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.209 In the process,
the majority ignored the clear indication that “because of” does not require a
but-for causation standard. Indeed, as Justice Brennan noted when the Supreme
Court first interpreted Title VII’s use of the words “because of” in Price
Waterhouse, Congress clearly did not want the words “because of” to be
construed to mean “solely because of,” as it rejected an amendment that would
have placed the word “solely” in front of the words “because of.”210 In fact, the

208. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534 (majority opinion).
209. Id. at 2527.
210. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 n.7 (1989). One scholar, writing before
Price Waterhouse was decided, discussed the legislative history of Title VII and found the
following:
One piece of the legislative history does indicate a clear recognition of the mixed-motive
dilemma. Senator McClellan proposed an amendment that would have defined a [T]itle
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assertion that “because of” meant solely because of was so absurd to Justice
Brennan that it only required a sentence and a footnote for him to dispose of
the claim.211 An assertion that was so easy for Justice Brennan to reject,
however, held the day in Nassar. To the majority, Gross’s reasoning was a
good indication of the natural meaning and fair interpretation of the words of
Title VII.212 Indeed, the majority never even addressed Congress’s rejection of
the word “solely” in connection with the words “because of.”213 Apparently, at
least in the eyes of the majority, a case that relied on the dictionary definition
of a word is a better indicator of the meaning of the statute’s language than
Congress’s own actions in drafting the statute.
Moreover, even though the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse had
previously determined that the words “because of” in the Title VII context did
not mean “solely because of” but actually implied that discriminatory intent
could not be a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment
decision,214 the majority refused to give deference to Price Waterhouse.215
According to the majority, Congress rejected all of Price Waterhouse when it
enacted the 1991 Act.216 Such a bare assertion by the majority misconstrues
what Congress actually did in passing the 1991 Act, however. While Congress
did reject the part of Price Waterhouse that gave the employer the ability to
avoid liability altogether by showing that it would have made the same
employment decision absent a discriminatory intent,217 Congress actually
embraced Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of the words “because of.”218
Indeed, Congress codified the part of Price Waterhouse that allowed an
VII violation as occurring only when prohibited discrimination was the sole ground for
the personnel action. Senator Case responded: “The Senator from Arkansas, as always,
seeks to provide the benefit of great clarity and simplicity in his objectives and methods.
The difficulty with this amendment is that it would render [T]itle VII totally nugatory. If
anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of
animal from any I know of. But beyond that difficulty, this amendment would place upon
persons attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the violation
was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely worthless. I therefore regret that
we are obliged to oppose the amendment, and also to recommend that it be rejected.” The
McClellan amendment and a similar proposal in the House were both defeated.
Brodin, supra note 42, at 296–97.
211. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7. Justice Brennan addressed the assertion by
stating, “Moreover, since we know that the words ‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,’
we also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate considerations.” Id. at 241.
212. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
213. See id.
214. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
215. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
216. Id.
217. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2006).
218. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
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employee to demonstrate that his or her protected status was a motivating
factor in an employer’s adverse employment decision.219 Such a standard is
only appropriate, however, if the words “because of” do not mean “solely
because of.” Thus, in embracing Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor
standard, and implicitly rejecting the but-for standard advocated by the Price
Waterhouse dissent, Congress clearly signaled that the words “because of”
should not be construed to require but-for causation but should be construed to
allow for a motivating-factor standard. Thus, even if the actual text of the 1991
Act does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims, Price Waterhouse’s
interpretation of “because of” should still govern, as it most closely reflects
Congress’s indications that “because of” does not mean “solely because of.”
Finally, the majority’s reliance on Gross is inappropriate. In Gross, the
Supreme Court strenuously tried to distinguish Title VII from the ADEA,
stating that “[b]ecause Title VII is materially different with respect to the
relevant burden of persuasion . . . [decisions construing Title VII] do not
control our construction of the ADEA.”220 Thus, the Supreme Court in Gross
refused to give weight to cases interpreting Title VII in determining what
“because of” meant under the ADEA.221 However, when the majority in
Nassar was tasked with determining what “because of” meant under Title
VII’s retaliation statute, it looked to Gross as a guiding light in its analysis and
rejected Price Waterhouse as inconsistent with Gross.222 Therefore, according
to the majority, while it is not appropriate to use Title VII cases to interpret
“because of” under the ADEA, it is more than appropriate, even necessary, to
give deference to ADEA cases in deciding how to interpret “because of” under
Title VII. This very flip-flop between principles led Justice Ginsburg to ask the
only natural question in this situation: “What sense can one make of this other
than ‘heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses’?”223
2.

Supreme Court Precedent Demonstrates that Retaliation Is
Discrimination

The majority also failed to follow Supreme Court precedent that has
consistently construed retaliation to be another form of discrimination.224 In the
majority’s view, its previous decisions stated only a “general proposition that
Congress’ enactment of a broadly phrased antidiscrimination statute may
signal a concomitant intent to ban retaliation against individuals who

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). See also supra note 156.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009).
Id. at 174.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
Id. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2529–30; see supra Part I.
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oppose[d] that discrimination.”225 Because Title VII is a precise, complex, and
exhaustive statute, the majority argued, the decisions which treat retaliation as
an implicit corollary of status-based discrimination are inapposite.226 The
majority’s sweeping dismissal of the precedential value of that line of cases,
however, ignores the clear language and reasoning the Supreme Court used in
deciding those cases. For example, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education, the Supreme Court decided that a ban on sex discrimination under
Title IX implicitly included a ban on retaliation because “[r]etaliation against a
person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another
form of intentional sex discrimination.”227 Thus, retaliation against someone
for complaining of status-based discrimination, according to the Supreme
Court in Jackson, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of that
protected status.228 To the majority in Nassar, this reasoning only applies when
it is a broad statute proscribing discrimination.229 As Justice Ginsburg aptly
noted, however, “[i]t is strange logic indeed to conclude that when Congress
homed in on retaliation and codified the proscription, as it did in Title VII,
Congress meant protection against that unlawful employment practice to have
less force than the protection available when the statute does not mention
retaliation.”230
The more informed interpretation, given the Court’s previous assertions
that retaliation is just another form of status-based discrimination, is that
references to status-based discrimination should be read to include retaliation.
Thus, the motivating-factor standard adopted by the 1991 Act, because it
applies to status-based discrimination claims, should also be read to apply to
retaliation claims.
3.

Maintaining a But-For Causation Standard Does Not Save Judicial
Resources

The majority also noted that the proper interpretation of the causation
standard for Title VII retaliation claims was important to the “fair and
responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems,”
especially since “the number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now
outstripped those for every type of status-based discrimination except race.”231
Though the majority did not say it in as many words, it clearly wanted to make
it more difficult to bring a retaliation claim under Title VII to save judicial

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530 (majority opinion).
Id.
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). See also supra Part I.
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530.
Id. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2531 (majority opinion).
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resources and lessen the overall number of retaliation claims. The majority’s
“judicial resources” argument for the need of heightened, but-for causation
standard is flawed in many respects.
To begin with, the majority improperly compared the number of Title VII
retaliation claims to the number of each individual type of status-based
discrimination claim.232 Claims under the antiretaliation statute are often
brought in conjunction with claims under the antidiscrimination statute.233
Thus, for every one claim brought under the status-based discrimination
statute, whether it is for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin,
religion, or color, there is likely an additional claim brought under the
antiretaliation statute. Therefore, instead of comparing the overall number of
retaliation claims to the number of claims under each type of status-based
discrimination, i.e., to the number of race claims, the number of sex claims,
etc., the much fairer comparison is to the overall number of status-based
discrimination claims. Indeed, when making this comparison, it becomes clear
that the overall number of status-based claims still greatly eclipse the overall
number of retaliation claims.234 Thus, the need for a heightened causation
standard for Title VII retaliation claims in order to save judicial resources is
not as pressing as the majority would like it to seem.
Moreover, even if a heighted standard would prevent more employees
from filing claims under the antiretaliation statute, there is no guarantee that
this would actually save judicial resources. As stated, these claims are often
brought in conjunction with one another.235 While a heightened standard of
causation for Title VII retaliation claims may prevent an individual from
claiming retaliation, it would not prevent the individual from filing claims
under the antidiscrimination statute. Thus, the overall number of charges may
not meaningfully decrease.
Moreover, the preservation of judicial resources is not a justifiable reason
for trying to effectively close the courthouse doors to employees claiming
retaliation under Title VII.236 Instead of enforcing a but-for causation standard

232. Id.
233. Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1065–66,
1072 (2013). One scholar wrote:
To be sure, judicial workload is a critical concern. As noted earlier, the lower courts have
faced rising caseloads over the last several decades—a fact the justices have emphasized.
Today, both federal district and appellate judges must contend with hundreds of filings
per year, meaning that their ability to give attention to individual cases is greatly reduced.
Employing the tools at hand, district judges have come to rely more heavily on the aid of
magistrate judges, and appellate judges have come to rely on the assistance of staff
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to make it less appealing to file a Title VII retaliation claim, the Supreme Court
should focus on other ways to save judicial resources.
Finally, the majority also argued that lessening the standard could
contribute to the filing of frivolous claims and siphon resources away from
administrative agencies trying to fight workplace discrimination.237 However,
the EEOC, the administrative agency principally responsible for workplace
discrimination claims, was not similarly worried about the filing of frivolous
claims and the siphoning of its resources.238 In fact, the EEOC argued that the
motivating-factor standard should apply to Title VII retaliation claims, making
the majority’s assertion that it needed protection from frivolous claims
unmoving.239
B.

But-For Standard Is Too Difficult to Prove and Too Hard to Apply

The decision in Nassar is also flawed because the but-for causation
standard is inappropriate in the Title VII context—it will be too difficult for
employees to prove and too hard for juries to understand.240 The but-for
causation standard requires the employee to show that his or her protected
activity was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse employment action,
which essentially asks the employee to somehow determine what the employer
would have done if it had not taken the protected activity into account.241 As
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Gross, this is no easy task:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” causation. In
that context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of
physical causation make the concept of “but-for” causation comparatively easy
to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an entirely different matter
to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive. . . . In a case where we
characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple
motives, say, both because the employee was old and because he wore loud

attorneys and other case-management tools to cope with their workload. Still, judges and
scholars alike have called for an expansion of the bench and limiting the flow of cases to
alleviate the strain on the federal courts. Thus, when the justices express their desire to
avoid inviting new claims into federal courts, the underlying concern is not a trivial one.
The critical question, though, is whether considerations of judicial workload can stand as
an independent factor in shaping the Court’s interpretation of substantive law. . . .
Therefore, although the Court may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the number
of filings, and particularly frivolous filings, does not become too high, it should be wary
of using substantive law as the limiting device.
Id.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531–32 (2013).
See id. at 2533.
Id.
For a more in-depth critique of the but-for causation standard, see Brodin, supra note 42.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190–91 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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clothing, to apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry
about what would have happened if the employer’s thoughts and other
circumstances had been different. The answer to this hypothetical inquiry will
often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does
the employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the employer
242
will often be in a stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.

Thus, employees will have to demonstrate to the jury what the employer
would have done in a different scenario, but doing so will require the employee
to “get inside” the employer’s head to determine what it really thought when it
made the adverse employment decision. Moreover, employees must make this
showing even though the crucial evidence of what the employer would have
done is under the control of the employer—the employee’s adversary in the
retaliation claim.243 This places too great of a burden on employees trying to
prove retaliation claims.
Moreover, the but-for causation standard does not have a sufficiently
strong deterrent effect. One of the main purposes of Title VII is to deter
employers from discriminating against employees.244 The but-for causation
standard, however, allows employers to retaliate against their employees as
long as the retaliatory motive does not rise to the level of but-for causation.245
Thus, employers are not deterred from engaging in discrimination. Unless the
employee can succeed under the but-for causation standard—an unlikely event
given that the employer holds the crucial evidence needed to prove the claim—
the employer will not be held liable for its retaliatory actions.246
Furthermore, now that status-based discrimination claims and retaliation
claims will be governed by two different causation standards, when the claims
are brought together, the risk is much greater that juries will be confused and
will have a difficult time applying the correct standard to each claim.247 On the
status-based discrimination claim, juries will only have to determine if the

242. Id.
243. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 515–16, 516 n.104 (2006).
244. Brodin, supra note 42, at 317.
245. See id. at 316–17.
246. See id. at 317. Brodin states:
Yet, [the but-for] causal theory appears to be based on two highly dubious assumptions.
The first is that [T]itle VII’s only goal is compensating “victims” . . . The first assumption
flies in the face of congressional and judicial pronouncements that the primary objective
(or at least one primary objective) of [T]itle VII is the elimination of discrimination in
employment opportunities. With this deterrence goal in mind, why should a plaintiff be
required, in order to establish a violation, to go beyond proving that race or another
forbidden criterion was a motivating factor in the decision?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
247. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2546 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in the employment decision,248
while on the retaliation claim, the jury will have to determine that the
discriminatory motive was the but-for cause of the employment action.249 As
Justice Ginsburg notes, because the Supreme Court has enforced this
heightened causation standard on retaliation claims, courts will surely struggle
with how to properly instruct juries in these cases.250
C. The Policy and Purpose Behind the Antiretaliation Statute Calls for a
Lesser Standard
Most importantly, the Nassar decision was wrongly decided because the
purpose behind the antiretaliation statute calls for a lesser standard. Congress
sought to eliminate workplace discrimination when it enacted Title VII.251 To
this end, the status-based discrimination statute and retaliation statute are
aimed at deterring employers from having a discriminatory or retaliatory
motive when they make adverse employment decisions.252 Moreover,
according to the Supreme Court, while the antidiscrimination statute “seeks a
workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status,” the antiretaliation statute
“seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”253 Thus, the two statues
work hand-in-hand to accomplish Title VII’s objectives.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee provides a further
explanation of the purpose of Title VII’s retaliation statute.254 In deciding to
interpret the antiretaliation statute broadly to cover an employee who did not
speak out about discrimination on her own initiative, the Supreme Court noted
that employees would not be willing to report discrimination unless the
antiretaliation statute constituted a meaningful remedy.255 The court
hypothesized that “[i]f it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with

248. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
249. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534 (majority opinion).
250. Id. at 2535, 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251. Brodin, supra note 42, at 294–95. “[Title VII’s] purpose was stated broadly and
ambitiously in a congressional report: ‘to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal
remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national
origin.’” Id. (citation omitted).
252. Id. at 320.
253. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
254. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 271
(2009).
255. Id. at 271–72, 279.
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no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about
Title VII offenses against themselves or against others.”256
Beyond the Supreme Court’s explanation of the purpose behind Title VII’s
antiretaliation statute, scholars have also documented the policy reasons behind
broadly interpreting the antiretaliation statute in a way that provides the
greatest amount of protection to employees as possible.257 Studies demonstrate
that retaliation works to suppress discrimination claims.258 Indeed, “[f]ear of
retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their
concerns about bias and discrimination.”259 If and when employees become
willing to speak out against discrimination, retaliation steps in both to punish
the employees and to return the workplace to its social norms.260 Given the
relationship between challenging discrimination and retaliation, therefore, “the
effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people’s
ability to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation.”261
Thus, both the stated purpose behind Title VII and its antiretaliation statute
and the policy behind interpreting retaliation statutes broadly demonstrate the
need and appropriateness of allowing employees to proceed under a
motivating-factor causation standard when bringing a Title VII retaliation
claim. In fact, requiring the employee to demonstrate that his protected activity
was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse employment action directly
contradicts these stated purposes as it makes it harder for an employee to
succeed on a retaliation claim and, therefore, weakens the antiretaliation
statute. As the Supreme Court has recognized, without a strong prohibition
against retaliation, employees will be less willing to confront discrimination in
the workplace.262 Title VII has no other meaningful enforcement mechanism,
however. If employees refuse to police their employers and seek redress from
discrimination, employers can continue to discriminate without much fear of
being held accountable for their actions.263 Thus, for Title VII to be effective in
carrying out its purpose, employees must feel free to speak out against
discrimination in the workplace. Instead of encouraging employees to
challenge workplace discrimination, however, the but-for causation standard
will only discourage people from speaking out. Indeed, the best way to
encourage employees to confront discrimination and make Title VII more

256. Id. at 279.
257. See Brake, supra note 17, at 25–42; Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s
Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 378–79 (2010).
258. See Brake, supra note 17, at 21, 26, 36–37.
259. Id. at 20.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279
(2009).
263. Id.
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effective is to enforce a motivating-factor standard for Title VII retaliation
claims, as it gives an employee a much better chance of succeeding on a
retaliation claim if the employer chooses to respond via retaliation to the
employee’s opposition to discrimination.
VII. PROPOSAL: CALL TO CONGRESS TO ACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar must be addressed. In deciding
that Title VII retaliation claims must proceed under a but-for causation
standard, the Supreme Court greatly limited the ability of employees to get
relief for their employers’ retaliatory efforts. Such a result fails to adequately
deter employers from engaging in retaliation. Moreover, the decision
undermines the very purpose of Title VII in protecting employees from
workplace discrimination. Without a strong prohibition against retaliation,
employees will be less willing to confront discrimination in the workplace and
the effectiveness of the prohibition against status-based discrimination will
decrease.264 Congress previously took action after the Supreme Court cut back
on the scope and effectiveness of antidiscrimination laws,265 and if it wants to
ensure that the protections guaranteed under Title VII are still effective in
eliminating workplace discrimination, Congress will need to act again.
Other scholars have previously called on Congress to address the causation
standard for Title VII retaliation claims.266 These scholars invited Congress to
act before the Supreme Court decided Nassar. Now that the Supreme Court has
signaled its clear intention to make it tougher for employees to succeed on
retaliation claims, Congressional action is more important than ever. The only
option left for employees to be properly protected against retaliation is for
Congress to amend Title VII and create a motiving-factor provision for
retaliation claims.
A.

The Proposed Options for Congressional Amendment to Title VII

If Congress does choose to amend Title VII’s antiretaliation statute and
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar, Congress will have to decide
which causation standard it should apply to retaliation claims. Congress may
consider the following options: 1) the 1991 Act’s framework, 2) Price
Waterhouse’s framework, 3) formulations of the motivating-factor standard
found in lower courts, or 4) a complete overhaul of Title VII.
Under the 1991 Act framework, employees claiming retaliation would
need to demonstrate that their protected activity was a motivating factor in the

264. See supra Part VI.
265. See supra Part III; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. II, at 2–4 (1991).
266. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1073, 1105.
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employer’s adverse employment action.267 If an employee could make this
showing, the employer could then lessen the damages it would have to pay by
demonstrating that it would have made the same employment decision
regardless of the discriminatory motive.268
Under the Price Waterhouse framework, employees would again need to
only demonstrate that that their protected activity was a motivating factor in
the employer’s adverse employment action.269 If an employee could make this
showing, under this framework, the employer could avoid all liability by
demonstrating that it would have made the same employment decision
regardless of the discriminatory motive.270
Congress could also decide to adopt one of the lower court’s formulations
of the motivating-factor standard. Thus, it could require the employee to show
by clear and convincing evidence (instead of the usual preponderance of the
evidence) that a discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in an
employment decision.271 After the employee made this showing, Congress
could either allow the employer to avoid all liability or just lessen the damages
award by proving that it would have made the same decision even in the
absence of discrimination.272
Finally, Congress could decide to completely overhaul Title VII instead of
just amending Title VII to add a motivating-factor framework to the
antiretaliation provision.
B.

The Best Option: Adding the 1991 Act’s Framework to the Antiretaliation
Provision

Congress should choose to enact an approach similar to the 1991 Act, as it
strikes the right balance between employees’ and employers’ needs. The Price
Waterhouse framework, although less employer friendly than the but-for
causation standard, is still too employer friendly. While the first leg of the
Price Waterhouse framework—requiring the employee to demonstrate that his
protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse
employment decision273—may be appropriate to apply to Title VII retaliation
claims, the second leg of Price Waterhouse warrants rejection of the
framework as the best choice for a congressional amendment. The second leg
allows the employer to escape liability by demonstrating that it would have

267. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
268. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
269. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
270. Id. at 248–50.
271. See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366–68 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fadhl v. City & Cnty. of
S.F., 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984).
272. Toney, 705 F.2d at 1370, 1373; Fadhl, 741 F.2d at 1166.
273. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249.
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made the same decision regardless of the employer’s retaliatory intent.274 By
allowing the employer a “get out of a jail free” card, the standard loses most, if
not all, of its deterrent effect. Employers would still be able to have a
retaliatory motive without facing any consequences. Furthermore, because the
employer can escape liability even if it does take the employee’s protected
activity into account, employees would be deterred from confronting
discrimination in the workplace.
Most importantly, however, Congress has already shown its contempt for
the second leg of the Price Waterhouse framework.275 Indeed, Congress clearly
believed that the second leg of the framework reduced the protections Title VII
guaranteed to employees.276 When it added the motivating-factor framework to
the status-based discrimination provision, it did not include the provision that
allowed the employer to escape liability.277 Thus, on the whole, the Price
Waterhouse standard is not the best option for Congress to choose if it does
decide to amend Title VII.
The other formulations within the lower courts are also too employerfriendly and should be rejected. The formulations are variations on the 1991
Act and Price Waterhouse frameworks. Both formulations use a motivatingfactor standard, but one formulation allows the employer to escape liability and
the other allows the employer to lessen the damages it must pay.278 The key
distinction is that the formulations require employees to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their protected activity was a motivating factor in the
adverse employment action.279 A requirement that the employee prove its
claim by clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to preponderance of the
evidence, places too high of a burden on employees. Most of the evidence
showcasing why an employer made an adverse employment decision is in the
hands of the employer,280 and therefore, the employee’s chance of having
enough evidence to prove his or her claim under a clear and convincing
standard is unlikely. In this way, the clear and convincing burden of proof
defeats the purpose of having a motivating-factor standard, and these lower
court formulations must also be rejected.
At least one commentator has called on Congress to overhaul all of Title
VII instead of amending it piece by piece.281 Although an overhaul may

274. Id.
275. See supra Part III.
276. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2006).
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
278. See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fadhl v. City & Cnty. of
S.F., 741 F.2d 1163, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 1984)
279. See Toney, 705 F.2d at 1367–68.
280. See Katz, supra note 243, at 515–16, 516 n.104.
281. See William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page From Parliament’s Playbook
and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 141–43 (2013).
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provide the most benefit in the long run, getting Congress to completely
overhaul Title VII is unlikely. In fact, to think that Congress would take the
time to revisit all of Title VII is just downright unrealistic. Thus, at least in the
interim, Congress needs to address the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar
and provide for a lesser causation standard for retaliation claims.
Given the problems with the other options, if Congress were to amend
Title VII and include a provision allowing for a lesser standard, the best option
is to enact a standard similar to the 1991 Act’s framework. Indeed, the 1991
Act’s framework strikes the right balance. The first leg of the approach allows
the employee to demonstrate that his protected activity was a motivating factor
in the adverse employment action,282 which properly protects employees and
reassures them that employers will be held accountable for retaliatory acts.
Thus, employees will be more willing to confront discrimination in the
workplace, and Title VII’s provisions will become more effective. Moreover,
by allowing employers to lessen the amount of damages they must pay by
demonstrating that they would have made the same decision in the absence of
the retaliatory motive,283 employers will still have a degree of protection. Thus,
employers will still be deterred from engaging in retaliation, but employees
will not receive a windfall by receiving compensation even if the employer
would have made the same decision.
In all, the 1991 Act’s standard most accurately reflects the purpose of the
antiretaliation statute as well as the overall purpose of Title VII as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar created an unnecessary hurdle to
jump through in order to succeed on a Title VII retaliation claim. By enforcing
a but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims, the Supreme Court
weakened the protection employees need against the retaliatory actions of their
employers and, in turn, lessened the effectiveness of Title VII’s status-based
discrimination statute in creating a discrimination-free workplace. If left
unaddressed, the decision will threaten the very purpose of Title VII.
Therefore, Congress must respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar.
Indeed, Congress should add a provision to Title VII’s antiretaliation statute
that creates a motivating-factor standard for retaliation claims similar to the
motivating-factor provision already in place for status-based discrimination
claims. By amending Title VII and adding a motivating-factor standard for

282. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
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retaliation claims, Congress will restore the protections guaranteed to
employees and signal to the Supreme Court its desire that Title VII be read in a
way that furthers the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.
JENNA HUENEGER

 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Saint Louis University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Laura
Schulz for providing guidance and encouragement throughout the development of this Note.
Thanks also to my friends and family, especially my husband Drew, for their continued support
and prayers. Psalm 16:2; Hebrews 10:36.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

938

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:897

